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In a recent paper, Yates and Jagacinski (1979) presented evidence for 
what was referred to as a "reference effect" in the process by which 
people evaluate multiattribute alternatives. Barton and John (1980) argue 
that it is inappropriate to characterize the observed phenomenon as a 
reference effect. We wish to take this opportunity to clarify what the 
issues are and what the data and analyses of Yates and Jagacinski and 
Barron and John really have to say about those issues. 
ISSUE 1: THE PHENOMENON 
The phenomenon in question is somewhat obscured in the Barron and 
John paper. Yates and Jagacinski speculated that multiattribute evalua- 
tion procedures requiring the evaluator to make reference to a baseline 
alternative that is uniformly worst on all relevant attribute dimensions are 
likely to be "problematic." It was argued that the problems rest in two 
things: (a) the difficulty of actually appreciating what such catastrophic 
alternatives really entail (because they are very rare) and (b) the likely 
difference in character of evaluations of alternatives similar to these 
catastrophic alternatives as compared to evaluations of alternatives that 
are not so "underwhelming." The second part of the argument was spe- 
cialized to a claim that most preference structures one is likely to en- 
counter are such that differences among alternatives close to the uni- 
formly worst alternative matter very little to the evaluator, while equiva- 
lent differences among alternatives close to the uniformly best alternative 
matter a great deal. So, the phenomenon under consideration is the evalu- 
ation process over particular regions of an alternative or "consequence" 
space, in the language of Keeney and Raiffa (1976, p. 67). Yates and 
Jagacinski asserted that in regions near the uniformly worst alternative, 
evaluations should be ambiguous, but generally such that evaluation dif- 
ferences are minimal. In contrast, evaluations in other regions of the 
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space should be much more meaningful. In addition, evaluation differ- 
ences among alternatives close to the alternative considered to be best on 
all relevant dimensions should be quite sizable. 
ISSUE 2: EXPLANATIONS OF THE PHENOMENON 
Why should the kinds of reference effects described above occur or not 
occur? That is, how might evaluations over particular areas of a conse- 
quence space be explained? This is the most important issue of all, from a 
theoretical standpoint. 
Barron and John purport to provide an "explanation" of the effects in 
question in terms of multiplicative value functions of a given form. Such 
an approach might provide a description of the effects, but hardly an 
explanation. An analogy clarifies the point: Suppose an investigator col- 
lects a set of paired observations of two variables and then plots them. He 
observes that the plot is monotone increasing in a nice, regular pattern. 
He then fits a regression line to the points and finds that it characterizes 
the plot fairly well. Few of us would then be willing to say that the 
investigator has "explained" the relationship between the two variables; 
he has merely described it, albeit perhaps effectively and parsimoniously. 
Common experience and intuition tell us that the simplest type of well- 
behaved function that has the same form as the reference effects hypothe- 
sized by Yates and Jagacinski is a multiplicative function that "fans 
out ."  This is what Barton and John claim as their major point. This 
observation does not advance us much further than the hypothetical inves- 
tigator who explains already known bivariate relationships by fitting re- 
gression lines. 
We contend that a key to understanding reference effects is recognizing 
that any multiattribute evaluation situation involves not one, but three 
preference structures: (a) a "judged preference structure"; (b) a "norma- 
tive preference structure"; and (c) an "experienced preference struc- 
ture." An example highlights the distinctions. A particular car buyer is 
confronted with tradeoffs among the dimensions of style, operational 
economy, comfort, and price. If he is provided with an array of descrip- 
tions of cars in terms of these characteristics and asked to evaluate them, 
he does so using his judged preference structure. If he is asked to report 
how he feels he "should" evaluate such an array of car descriptions, his 
normative preference structure becomes operative. If he is allowed to 
actually see and "experience" each car and is then required to indicate 
his evaluations, his experienced preference structure is called into play. 
There is no reason to expect all three of these preference structures to 
be identical. Indeed, certain systematic discrepancies ought to be antici- 
pated, although the structures should rely on one another in particular 
ways. Experienced preferences are in some sense the ultimate criterion in 
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decision making. Unfortunately,  they are almost never  discussed in the 
decision literature. One can therefore only speculate about  the nature of  
experienced preference structures. For  a particular attribute dimension i, 
i = 1 . . . . .  n, suppose that the best  conceivable level of  the dimension is 
represented by B*, while the worst  conceivable level of the dimension is 
symbolized by W~. The entire consequence space, what might be referred 
to as the " c o m p l e t e "  consequence space, is then the product  set C* = X* 
x X* × . . .  × X*, where X* is the set consisting of  all conceivable levels 
of  attribute dimension i. Consider the alternative W* = (W*, W* . . . . .  W*), 
the uniformly worst  alternative. Two things are likely to be true about W*. 
First, W* probably does not exist. While individually each of  W*, i = 1, 
• . .  , n, is likely to be achievable, their joint  occurrence in many instances 
is not only highly improbable, but practically impossible. For  instance, in 
the domain of  cars, what manufacturer  would offer a car that for  even one 
individual is considered to be the ugliest, the most costly to run, the most 
wretched to ride in, and the most expensive to buy? The market  would 
rapidly see to the extinction of  such manufacturers.  The second observa- 
tion: Suppose that W* is altered by changing one of W*, i = 1 . . . . .  n, to 
B*, i.e., W* becomes W *  = (W*, . . . .  B*, . . . ,  W*). How are the 
evaluations of W* and W*~ likely to compare with each other? Most indi- 
viduals one might query will find it hard to bring to mind a consequence 
space in which such evaluations will be substantially different from each 
other. (Try it!) Moreover ,  the likelihood of large differences in the evalu- 
ations of  W* and W*~ decreases as the dimensionality of  the consequence 
space increases, i.e.,  as the number  of  relevant attribute dimensions in- 
creases• The dampening effect of  the worst-level attributes grows as they 
become more numerous• 
Consider the alternative B* = (B*, B* . . . . .  B*). Alternatives such as 
B* should not be nearly as rare as those similar to W*, if for no other  
reasons besides market  considerations. They  are, nevertheless,  likely to 
be scarce  and inaccess ible  because  they  will be in great  demand.  
Moreover ,  structural constraints will often make the existence of alterna- 
tives such as B* actually impossible. For  example,  one cannot conceive of  
a car that is simultaneously the largest and the least expensive to operate.  
How might the evaluations of  B* and B*i = (B* . . . .  , W* . . . . .  B*) 
compare?  Again, we submit that while most individuals will find it easier 
to bring to mind consequence spaces where B* - B** evaluation differ- 
ences are large than to think of  spaces where W* - W** evaluation differ- 
ences are large, they will still find it a fairly hard task. In other words, we sus- 
pect that exper ienced  preference structures over  complete consequence 
spaces are represented by evaluation surfaces that are fairly flat near 
alternatives such as W* and B*, but much steeper practically everywhere  
else. Moreover ,  there is little reason to expect  such surfaces to generally 
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have nice, regular forms perfectly describable by simple rules such as 
additive or multiplicative value functions. 
In typical decision analyses, the relevant consequence space is not the 
complete one C*, but rather a restriction of it, C -- X1 × X2 × • • • × Xn, i 
= 1 . . . .  , n. Restricted consequence spaces extend over attribute dimen- 
sions whose bounds are defined by levels W~ and B~, i = 1 . . . . .  n, 
respectively. W~ is not less preferred than W*, and is generally preferred 
to W~. It is that level of attribute dimension i that is least attractive among 
all plausibly-encountered levels in the given situation. B~ is defined in an 
analogous fashion. Generalizing from what is suggested above, one would 
expect that among the alternatives available in a practical decision situa- 
tion, evaluation differences among alternatives nearest the uniformly 
worst alternative would be least, while differences among alternatives 
nearest the uniformly best alternative would be greatest. The latter alter- 
natives, which are near B = (Ba, B2 . . . . .  B,) in C, are likely to be rather 
middling in C*, i.e., in the region where the evaluation surface is steepest. 
What can a decision maker rely on when he or she is asked to evaluate a 
description of a hypothetical alternative in a decision making experiment 
or a decision analysis? In other words, what is the basis for a person's 
judged preference structure? We contend that judged preferences and 
evaluations rest on three things. First, they are in part the evaluator's 
speculations about what his or her experienced preference structure is 
like. As such, judged preferences clearly can be "wrong" in the same way 
that all predictions or estimates can be wrong. Moreover, judged prefer- 
ences and evaluations should be most in error for those types of alterna- 
tives with which the evalutor has had least experience. Thus, for instance, 
if a person who has only owned and driven compact cars all his life is 
asked to judge how he would evaluate an expensive, stylish, and well- 
built automobile, he might well be way off base. The second basis for 
judged evaluations is related to the first. We suspect that such evaluations 
deper~d heavily on the extent to which the descriptions of the alternatives 
are e~fective in getting the evaluator to psychologically "experience" 
each alternative. For instance, it is undoubtedly the case that pictures of 
particular automobiles will permit more accurate judgments of tradeoffs 
involving style than will verbal descriptions of those automobiles. The 
descriptions of alternatives in most decision analyses and experiments are 
remarkably impoverished. Accordingly, we cannot help wondering how 
seriously we should take the conclusions based on such exercises. Read- 
ing accounts of dialogues between decision analysts and their clients (e.g., 
in Keeney, 1977), one doubts that the client really appreciates what an 
alternative like (W1, W2, • • • , W,) really means when the attribute dimen- 
sions are such things as fatalities, radioactive wastes, chronic health ef- 
fects, and nuclear safeguards. 
M U L T I A T T R I B U T E  E V A L U A T I O N  R E F E R E N C E  EFFECTS 379 
The final basis for judged evaluations and preferences is the person's 
normative preference structure. Many decision makers are likely to feel 
that there is a way they should make evaluations, regardless of how they 
actually do make evaluations--judged or experienced. For example, a car 
buyer might recognize that his tradeoffs between style and economy have 
a certain form: "When I see a beautiful car, I just say 'To hell with the 
economy.'  " He might believe that those tradeoffs are not in his ultimate 
best interests, however, and seek to change them. Thus, when faced with 
a set of descriptions of alternatives, the evaluator is likely to moderate his 
or her judged evaluations to conform with the prescriptions of his or her 
normative preference structure. Discrepancies from such prescriptions 
would be considered errors of judgment. 
In terms of reference effects, what this all means for the sorts of judged 
evaluations and preferences that form the cornerstone of decision analysis 
is the following: (1) Evaluation differences should be minimal near uni- 
formly worst alternatives and largest near uniformly best alternatives, 
particularly when there are large numbers of attribute dimensions and 
when the descriptions of the alternatives are effective ones. (2) Evalua- 
tions of alternatives most similar to uniformly worst alternatives should 
contain a great deal of error, in the sense of being discrepant from what 
the eva lua to r ' s  experienced preference structure might require. (3) 
Evaluations of all alternatives might well exhibit substantial error relative 
to the evaluation policy prescribed by the evaluator's normative prefer- 
ence structure. In particular, the sorts of regional evaluation surface char- 
acteristics implied in (1) might be contrary to the way the evaluator feels 
he or she really ought to judge things. 
ISSUE 3: EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE PHENOMENON 
The evidence cited in both the Yates and Jagacinski and the Barron and 
John papers is primarily concerned with Claim 1. Yates and Jagacinski 
reported the results of nomothetic analyses of 48 subjects' evaluations 
which were consistent with Claim 1. Barron and John drew conclusions 
on the basis of the responses of Fischer's (1976) 10 subjects. Barron and 
John reported that riskless responses (and those are the ones most compa- 
rable to the Yates and Jagacinski subjects' responses) of 7 of those sub- 
jects revealed no reference effects at all, while the responses of the re- 
maining three subjects were said to suggest an effect opposite to that 
prescribed by Claim 1. 
What should be made of the apparent discrepancy in results? First of 
all, when given the choice between conclusions based on the responses of 
48 subjects and conclusions based on the responses of 10 subjects, most of 
us would be inclined toward the former. There were several important 
procedural differences between the Yates and Jagacinski and Fischer 
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studies: (a) While Yates and Jagacinski's subjects made evaluations of 
alternatives described in terms of their status along 5 attribute dimen- 
sions, the alternatives in Fischer's study were characterized on only 3 
dimensions. As indicated, the type of reference effect described in Claim 
I should increase in magnitude with the number of dimensions available to 
the subject. (b) All of Fischer's subjects evaluated alternatives defined by 
the same three attributes: salary, city, and type of work associated with 
prospective jobs. In contrast, the university courses evaluated by Yates 
and Jagacinski's subjects could be defined by any 5 out of a collection of 
52 different attribute dimensions. On these grounds alone one would lean 
toward accepting the generality of the results of the Yates and Jagacinski 
studies. (c) Each subject in the Yates and Jagacinski studies was required 
to actually bring to mind and write out descriptions of concrete exemplars 
of the relevant levels of each of the 5 attribute dimensions characterizing 
the alternatives he or she evaluated. On the other hand, such a procedure 
was required of Fischer's subjects for only 1 dimension, type of work, 
Thus, it is quite possible that the subjects in the Fischer study did not 
have as full an appreciation of what was actually entailed by each of the 
alternatives they evaluated as did the Yates and Jagacinski subjects. If a 
subject does not really think about what various alternatives mean, he or 
she should be relatively more inclined to evaluate them in an additive 
fashion. It is easier to perform evaluations that way; one does not have to 
pay much attention to what he or she is doing. (d) The best and worst 
levels of two of Fischer's 3 attribute dimensions, salary and city, were set 
arbitrarily by the investigator. In contrast, Yates and Jagacinski's sub- 
jects were instructed to define the best and worst levels of the attribute 
dimensions describing the courses they evaluated as those one could ex- 
pect among elective courses at a rather large state institution, the Univer- 
sity of Michigan. Thus, one would expect the best and worst levels of the 
attribute dimensions in the Yates and Jagacinski studies to be much 
farther apart in subjective value than those in the Fischer study, thus 
enhancing the chances of the types of reference effects of Claim 1. 
There is one final aspect of the Barron and John analyses that may be 
worrisome. Barron and John's analysis of Fischer's data relied upon a 
holistic assessment procedure developed by Barron and Person (1979). A 
key feature of that technique is the estimation of the K parameter in 
Keeney's (1974) or Dyer and Sarin's (1979) multiplicative utility and value 
functions. That parameter is estimated on the basis of two judgments 
defined by only one of the attribute dimensions available to the subject. 
Barron and John classified subjects' utility and value functions on the 
basis of such K estimates. Unfortunately, they did not report just what 
those estimates were. One of the difficulties of this procedure is that one 
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can easily obtain different estimates for the same subject, depending on 
the dimension used in the procedure. When that occurs, what does one 
conclude? When does one attribute discrepancies to random error and 
when does one conclude that the discrepancies signal that neither the 
additive nor the multiplicative model describes the subject's judgments? 
We applied the K estimation technique of Barron and Person to our sub- 
jects' responses and found substantial differences among estimates of K 
based on different dimensions. This result forces us to question Barton 
and John's conjecture that those subjects' preference structures conform 
to a multiplicative model with K > 0, even though among simple algebraic 
models that model provides the closest fit. 
The data cited by Barron and John as Well as those of Yates and 
Jagacinski have essentially no bearing on Claim 2, the assertion concern- 
ing the discrepancy between judged and experienced evaluations. As in- 
dicated above, the decision literature (with the exception of the social 
psychological decision literature; e.g., Janis & Mann, 1977) is devoid of 
attempts to even examine such discrepancies. A test of the assertion 
requires a longitudinal study in which judged and experienced evaluations 
of particular alternatives over a large consequence space are compared to 
each other. To the best of our knowledge, this sort of study has never 
been done. The closest to it are previously unreported studies conducted 
by ourselves. In one study, subjects evaluated, then enrolled in and com- 
pleted, and finally evaluated again university elective courses. In the 
other study, subjects similarly provided preliminary and retrospective 
evaluations of films. In both studies, initial and final evaluations bore little 
relation to each other. There are several reasons these studies do not 
provide a good test of Claim 2. Nevertheless, they do not make one 
optimistic that judged preference structures generally conform well to 
experienced preference structures. 
The results of Yates and Jagacinski constitute evidence directly rele- 
vant to the third claim outlined above, the hypothesis that discrepancies 
between judged and normative evaluations might be rather common. In- 
deed, the primary data of the Yates and Jagacinski studies amount to 
graphic indications of such discrepancies. Subjects were instructed to 
select attribute dimensions such that their evaluations of alternatives 
varying along those dimensions would be unaffected by the status of the 
alternatives with respect to the remaining dimensions. The subjects' 
evaluations clearly did not conform to that requirement. 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The jury is still out. It may well be the case that the propositions we put 
forth are wrong. They are testable, however, and in due time will be 
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subjected to tests beyond those reported by Yates and Jagacinski and 
Barron and John. For the moment, the weight of the evidence seems to be 
consistent with those propositions. 
Suppose the hypothesized effects do hold up upon rigorous testing. 
Consider their implications for decision analysis procedures. Most simple 
rating methods such as Edwards' SMART technique (Gardiner & Ed- 
wards, 1975) ignore issues of attribute interactions and assume that pref- 
erence structures are additive. The reference effects hypothesized here 
suggest that such an assumption is surely wrong, at least in regard to 
judged and experienced preference structures. It is an open question 
whether a given decision maker's normative preference structure is addi- 
tive, i.e., whether he or she would like for his or her preferences to be 
describable by an additive model. Thus, it is probably wise for users of 
methods such as SMART to incorporate procedures intended to find out 
what the decision maker's normative preference structure is like and to 
test the sensitivity of resultant decisions to the form of the normative 
preference structure. 
Theoretically precise techniques such as those advocated by Keeney 
and Raiffa (1976) include routines for checking the consistency of the 
decision maker's judged preference structure with various conditions re- 
quired for representing such structures by simple algebraic models. So, 
presumably, the types of effects hypothesized here would manifest them- 
selves at the condition-testing stage of a decision analysis. Thus, we 
should expect that more often than not, conditions for simple algebraic 
models will not be met. Even when they are apparently met, however, one 
should be careful to see whether the decision maker really appreciates 
what alternatives with large numbers of worst-level attributes really mean 
or whether he or she is simply taking the line of least resistance and only 
verbally acknowledging agreement with such principles as preferential 
independence. Our view of the decision problem suggests that the very 
notion of modeling a decision maker' s judged or even experienced prefer- 
ence structure might miss the major point of attempting to aid decision 
makers. The typical decision maker is not interested in modeling how he or 
she does make decisions, but rather how he or she should  make decisions. 
Thus, decision analysts should reorient their basic emphasis away from 
the modeling of judged preference structures to the modeling of normative 
preference structures. 
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